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Money has always been a difficult and complex concept and the views about what money actually is 
could hardly be more diverse. This is all the more true in the times of completely manipulated 
irredeemable paper currencies, the functioning of which is based almost completely on the extent to 
which people believe in its trustworthiness. The final abolition of Gold as a universal standard of 
currencies in the early 1970s at first glance seems to have strengthened the grip of governments on 
money. Nevertheless, it is often argued that ‘national currencies’ are under threat. According to this 
view, ‘monetary sovereignty’ is waning, as is sovereignty as a whole. The present paper takes a 
different view. It argues that ‘monetary sovereignty’ understood as a legal concept remains intact and 
is not even significantly limited by obligations under public international law. This leaves 
governments significant leeway in taking decisions regarding the setup of their monetary regime 
(‘sovereignty games’) and empirical evidence shows the large number of different options that are 
actually chosen. 
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Introduction
∗ 
The more books one reads on money, the more one gets confused and frustrated about one’s 
incapacity to grasp the very essence, the idea of what constitutes money. Yet one can derive at least 
some comfort from the fact that even Nobel Prize laureate economists such as John Maynard Keynes 
or famous bankers such as Baron Rothschild – almost coquettishly – admitted to know only two or 
three people who actually understood money, but unfortunately disagreed about its nature.
1 
Rephrasing another quote of unknown origin slightly, one could say that there are three roads to 
madness: love, ambition and the study of money.
2 I am still undecided whether me being a lawyer by 
training – and therefore allegedly equipped with a natural confusion about numbers
3 – will make me 
go down that road even faster or rather slower. 
The disagreement as to the nature of money is not restricted to the different disciplines that deal 
with money: Economics, Law, Sociology, Political Science (and even Geography
4), but also manifests 
itself within the economic discipline itself.
5 To some extent, the difference in thinking about money 
reflects the diverse interests the disciplines have in the subject and is of no relevance to the others: 
Economists do not necessarily have to take into account in their treatment of monetary theory that 
money is a symbolic medium and a pre-condition of modern detached life-style from a sociological 
point of view.
6 Nor does a lawyer always have to consider what is used in practice as money when he 
has to answer the question as to the legal tender of a given country.
7 However, thinking about 
monetary sovereignty means thinking about the nature of a relationship between the State, the 
individual and the economy.  
According to the still important ‘State Theory of Money’, formulated in 1905 by G. F. Knapp, 
money is ‘a creature of law’
8, law being identified with the modern state. The key argument of this 
theory is the existence of debt. The State provides its power of enforcement of contractual debts, but 
defines what serves as satisfaction of the debt through the definition of legal tender. This definition is 
always a historic one, based on a recurrent link to the former currency in which old debt may have 
been denominated.
9 
                                                      
∗   Dr. jur. Christoph W. Herrmann, LL.M. European Law, Wirtschaftsjurist (Univ. Bayreuth) is Assistant Professor for 
European and International Economic Law at the University of Munich. At the time of writing, he was Jean-Monnet-
Fellow at the Robert-Schuman-Centre for Advanced Studies of the European University Institute, Florence. Email: 
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1   Quoted by Ingham (ed.), Concepts of Money (Cheltenham 2005), p. xi. 
2   Quoted in Chown, A History of Monetary Unions (London 2003), p. 5 with regard to Bimetallism. See also Marx’s 
reference to a statement made by Gladstone in a parliamentary debate on Peel’s Bank Act of 1844, who observed that 
‘not even love has turned more men into fools than has meditation on the nature of money’ (Marx, A Contribution to a 
Critique of Political Economy [Moscow 1970], p. 64). 
3   According to a common mistranslation of the principle iudex non calculat, lawyers are not able to calculate. The original 
meaning was that arguments, evidence and witnesses are not simply counted, but considered according to their merits. 
4   For a geographical approach to the study of money see Cohen, ‘The new geography of money’ in Gilbert/Helleiner (eds.), 
Nation-States and Money (London 1999), p. 121 with further references. 
5    For an account of the different positions see Ingham, The Nature of Money (Cambridge 2004) and Ingham (ed.), 
Concepts of Money (Cheltenham 2005); Proctor, Mann on the Legal Aspect of Money, 6
th Ed. (Oxford 2005), pp. 5 et seq. 
6   For sociological perspectives on money see Simmel, Philosophie des Geldes, 5
th Ed. (Munich 1930); Ingham, The Nature 
of Money (Cambridge 2004), pp. 59 et seq.; Zelizer, The Social Meaning of Money (New York 1994). 
7   For a legal definition of money see Proctor, Mann on the Legal Aspect of Money, 6
th Ed. (Oxford 2005), pp. 5 et seq. 
8   Knapp, Staatliche Theorie des Geldes, 4
th Ed. (Munich 1923), p. 1: „Geld ist ein Geschöpf der Rechtsordnung.“ 
9   Ibid., pp. 9 et seq. Christoph W. Herrmann 
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However, this legalistic understanding of money is widely rejected in economic circles, who tend 
to define money in a functional way (‘money is what money does’) and emphasise the actual 
acceptance as payment by economic entities as being decisive for something to become money. 
According to this view, money bears the functions of unit of account, means of exchange, standard of 
deferred payments and store of value. An item that fulfils all these functions will normally be 
considered by economists as ‘money’ with the medium of exchange function given supreme 
importance by mainstream economists (the so-called commodity theory of money).
10 This view may 
have been correct in the past, i.e. from early ancient times until the beginning of the 20
th Century. In 
those times the money stuff were predominantly precious metals (or banknotes and state-issued paper 
currencies convertible into metal), and accordingly the acceptance of money was based on the 
appreciation the money stuff itself enjoyed as a commodity. 
However, things have changed. Change began more or less one and a half centuries ago with the 
development of true non-redeemable paper currencies and found its ultimate completion with the 
break-down of the Bretton Woods System in 1971, when the remaining indirect link between all 
currencies and gold was given up. It is obvious that in our times money cannot simply be –as it had 
been widely believed over thousands of years– the most fungible commodity available anymore, even 
though this may have been the historical origin of money. It would contravene the ordinary meaning 
of the word ‘commodity’ to use it for money which is made of a substance that has no practical use 
whatsoever, or at least no real value which comes even close to the exchange value it normally 
embodies.
11 It holds even truer for book money which nowadays may be transferred electronically and 
has no bodily existence at all or for E-Money
12 or virtual currencies such as the Linden Dollars used in 
the virtual world of Second Life. 
Hence, the nature of money must be something different. As Georg Simmel has correctly pointed 
out in his Philosophy of Money (1900), money rests upon the trust of individuals who accept it as 
payment only because they believe that other individuals will accept it in their turn in the future.
13 The 
very core of this societal relationship is that of credit. According to that view, money embodies a 
negotiable claim upon society to receive goods and services of real value in the future in return for it. 
It certifies that its owner has made a real contribution to the economy for which he has received only 
the money stuff and no real goods or services. This view does neither contradict the functions ascribed 
to money by economic monetary theory –Schumpeter developed a very similar position later in his 
writings on the nature of money
14 and the credit theory of money, on which these thoughts were based, 
dates back to John Law’s writings at the beginning of the 18
th century
15– nor does it necessarily 
conflict with the State theory of money. Claims may very well be traded as commodities and trust in 
social and legal institutions has an extremely close relationship with the State and the law. It is a 
necessary sociological precondition of all legal institutions and of community as such. The importance 
of ‘credibility’ of monetary policy and the need for a ‘culture of stability’ are nowadays also widely 
accepted among monetary economists; hence the persistent call for independent central banks. 
It has been purported in academic writings that the two defining features of ‘national currencies’, 
i.e. their distinctness and exclusivity in a given territory, are under threat by different trends: 
                                                      
10  For an account of this ‘mainstream’ economic view see Ingham, The Nature of Money (Cambridge 2004), pp. 15 et seq. 
11  The practical value of paper money is probably exhaustively described by the following usages: sniffing cocaine through 
it, accelerating a fire with it, using it as wallpaper or toilet paper. 
12  For a definition of Electronic Money in European Law see Directive 2000/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 18 September 2000 on the taking up, pursuit of and prudential supervision of the business of electronic money 
institutions, OJ 2000 No. L 271/39. 
13  Simmel, Philosophie des Geldes, 5th Ed. (Munich 1930), p. 162. 
14    Schumpeter, ‘Das Sozialprodukt und die Rechenpfennige. Glossen und Beiträge zur Geldtheorie’ Archiv für 
Sozialwissenschaft 44 (1917), pp. 627 – 715; Schumpeter, Das Wesen des Geldes (Göttingen [1930] 1970) 
15  Cf. Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis (London 1954), pp. 321 et seq. Play Money? Contemporary Perspectives on Monetary Sovereignty 
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denationalization, regionalization and virtualization of money.
16 In the following we will try to tackle 
the question what monetary sovereignty is and what use States make of it at the beginning of the 21
st century. 
Monetary Sovereignty in Public International Law 
The power over money has persistently been regarded as one of the core elements of statehood since 
the development of the notion of ‘sovereignty’ by Jean Bodin.
17 The emergence of national currencies 
as such, i.e. money that is distinct and exclusive to the territory of a State, is seen as closely related to 
the formation of Nation States in modern times
18 and the use of the respective legal tender has often 
been coerced by authorities upon citizens.
19 Money is considered a symbol of national independence 
as well as integration and identity. However, national money is not always appreciated. In the words 
of John Stuart Mill: 
So much of barbarism still remains in the transactions of the most civilized nations, that almost all 
independent countries choose to assert their nationality by having, to their own inconvenience and 
that of their neighbours, a peculiar currency of their own.
20 
The presumption that an independent State would normally also have its own currency is also 
implied in the Statute of the International Monetary Fund. At its conclusion in 1944 it seemed rather 
unrealistic that an independent country could opt for not having a currency of its own.
21 
Sometimes, the relationship between a Nation and its money can have almost obsessive, even erotic 
traits, as may e.g. be the case with us Germans and the British. Calls for a ‘Denationalization of 
Money’
22 have therefore –leaving aside the amazing introduction of the Euro– neither been very 
frequent nor have they gained a great deal of support. Even liberal economists, e.g. the ordo-liberal 
Freiburger School of Walter Eucken and Franz Böhm, tend to take the State monopoly over money for 
granted or at least accept it. 
Public International Law reflects this general acceptance of the State power over money. According 
to an often quoted decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice in 1929, 
is [it] indeed a generally accepted principle of public international law that a State is entitled to 
regulate its own currency.
23 
The key legal consequence derived from this ius cudendae monetae is that the definition of a 
State’s currency to which a reference may be made in contracts, is solely described by the law of that 
State, the lex monetae. That means that national courts have to respect measures taken by other States 
in exercise of their monetary sovereignty.
24 It becomes relevant first and foremost in cases of a 
                                                      
16  Cf. Gilbert/Helleiner (eds.), Nation-states and money : the past, present and future of national currencies (New York 
1999). 
17  Bodin, Les six livres de la République (1583), Chapter X, p. 211  (223). 
18  Helleiner, The making of national money : territorial currencies in historical perspective (Ithaca 2003). 
19  Simmel, Philosophie des Geldes, 5
th Ed. (Munich 1930), p. 173. 
20  Mill, Principles of Political Economy (London 1848 (1909)), p. 615. 
21  See Gianviti, ‘Use of a Foreign Currency Under the IMF’s Articles of Agreement’ in IMF (ed.), Current Developments in 
Monetary and Financial Law, Vol. 3 (Washington 2005), p. 817 et seq. 
22  Hayek, Entnationalisierung des Geldes (Tuebingen 1977). 
23  PCIJ, Case Concerning the Payment of Various Serbian Loans Issued in France, Urteil vom 12. Juli 1929, Series A, Nos. 
20/1, p. 44. 
24  Proctor, Mann on the Legal Aspect of Money, 6
th Ed. (Oxford 2005), pp. 331 et seq. and pp. 499 et seq. Christoph W. Herrmann 
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currency reform or reconstruction such as the introduction of the Euro.
25 Furthermore, given the lack 
of specific treaty obligations, there will normally be no basis for a legal challenge of another State’s 
measures to organise its monetary system or of its conduct of monetary policy as long as this does not 
interfere with the monetary sovereignty of another State, e.g. by State-controlled counterfeiting of 
foreign currency.
26 
Elements of Monetary Sovereignty 
Monetary sovereignty encompasses a number of sovereign rights as well as policy tools.
27 Internally, 
the State is free to define its unit of account, to issue banknotes and coins and to declare them legal 
tender, to impose criminal sanctions on counterfeiting, to prohibit the use of other currencies inside its 
territory, to regulate the money supply and the banking system and to determine and change the value 
of its currency. 
Given its impact on the effective demand for a currency, one should also consider the definition of 
the means of payment for taxes and state debts as forming part of the monetary sovereignty of a 
State.
28 With regard to the external dimension of their currency, States may decide to impose exchange 
restrictions and controls on the flow of capital and payments, opt for a floating or fixed exchange-rate 
regime and define the exchange-rate vis-à-vis other currencies. 
Limitations to Monetary Sovereignty Deriving from the IMF Statute 
The sovereign rights of a State are limited by the provisions of international agreements it has entered 
into. With regard to monetary sovereignty, the main source for such limitations are the Articles of 
Agreement of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
29 With its 185 member countries, the IMF 
constitutes the virtually universal legal framework for the exercise of monetary sovereignty.
30 
However, it must be emphasised that every country is free to join and to leave the IMF,
31 i.e. 
membership is not an exogenously imposed restriction on sovereignty, but a deliberate self-restraint, 
something that is sometimes forgotten in the discourse about the waning of sovereignty in the times of 
globalization. 
For the present contribution, there are two main aspects of the rules of the IMF which deserve 
mentioning: 
•  Firstly, since the second amendment to the Articles, which came into force in 1978 and was 
designed to adapt the legal framework to the practice of freely floating exchange-rates that had 
emerged with the breakdown of the par value system in the early 1970s, members of the IMF are 
                                                      
25   In such a case, foreign courts must apply the changeover from the national currencies to the Euro when claims 
denominated in those currencies are brought before them, see Lenihan, The Legal Implications of the European Monetary 
Union under U.S. and New York Law (Brussels 1998). 
26  Cf. Proctor, Mann on the Legal Aspect of Money, 6
th Ed. (Oxford 2005), p. 531 et seq. 
27  On these elements see Gianviti, ‘Current Legal Aspects of Monetary Sovereignty’ in IMF (ed.), Current Developments in 
Monetary and Financial Law, Vol. 4 (Washington 2005), p. 1; Lastra, Legal Foundations of International Monetary 
Stability (Oxford 2006), pp. 22 et seq.; Proctor, Mann on the Legal Aspect of Money, 6
th Ed. (Oxford 2005), pp. 500 et 
seq. 
28  See van Dun, ‘National Sovereignty and International Monetary Regimes’ in Dowd/Timberlake (eds.), Money and the 
Nation State (New Brunswick 1998), p. 47 (60). 
29  On the law of the IMF in general see Lastra, Legal Foundations of International Monetary Stability (Oxford 2006), pp. 
371 et seq.; Lowenfeld, International Economic Law (Oxford 2002), pp. 529 et seq.; Proctor, Mann on the Legal Aspect 
of Money, 6
th Ed. (Oxford 2005), pp. 557 et seq. 
30  A list of the members can be consulted at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/members.htm. 
31  See Art. XXVI Sec. 1 IMF. Play Money? Contemporary Perspectives on Monetary Sovereignty 
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free to decide to fix or float the exchange rate of their currency against other currencies (Art. IV 
Sec. 2 (b) IMF). Even though one of the main purposes of the IMF is ‘to promote exchange 
stability, to maintain orderly exchange arrangements amongst members and to avoid competitive 
exchange depreciation’ (see Art. I (iii) IMF), there is ‘no clearly defined and self-standing legal 
duty to maintain stable currencies’ presently laid down in the IMF Articles.
32 Even the most 
substantive ‘hard obligation’, to ‘avoid manipulating exchange rates or the international 
monetary system in order to prevent effective balance of payments adjustment or to gain an 
unfair competitive advantage over other members’ (Art. IV Sec. 1 (iii) IMF) has turned out to be 
not very effective and has therefore been subject to changes most recently.
33 
•  Secondly, the introduction of restrictions on the making of payments and transfers for current 
international transactions
34 without the approval of the Fund is prohibited (Art. VIII Sec. 2 (a) 
IMF). Whether or not a member is allowed to restrict the transaction itself is a matter not for 
international monetary law, but for international trade law to decide. Under the WTO regime, 
which applies to the trade of its 150 member countries, quantitive restrictions on trade in goods 
are generally prohibited (with some exceptions), but may e.g. be imposed in case of balance-of-
payments problems (see Art. XII, XV GATT, Art. XII GATS). Contrary to payments for current 
transactions, the IMF members are under no obligation to liberalize international capital transfers 
(Art. VI Sec. 3 IMF). Efforts in the 1990s that were aimed at introducing disciplines in that 
regard have lost momentum following the Asian crisis of the late 1990s.
35 
The Waning of Monetary Sovereignty 
It is one of the prominent and fashionable tenets of our time that the sovereignty of States is 
diminishing due to the process of globalisation. The same claim is being made with regard to 
‘monetary sovereignty’. According to Treves, the statement of the PCIJ nowadays is a mere figure of 
speech. However, Treves writings also reveal the source of much of the misunderstandings in the 
debates about the waning sovereignty in the post-Westphalian world order. According to him, 
sovereignty is a factual question, not a question of a right. However, this is exactly where legal 
understandings of sovereignty and political concepts differ significantly. From a purely legal point of 
view, sovereignty erodes only where obligations for a State may arise and be enforced without or even 
against the consent of that State. Sovereign is who is not subject to legally enforceable commands 
from a third party. From a political science perspective, sovereignty means absolute and factual 
independence. The problem with the latter view of course is that there is no State that possesses 
absolute independence in that sense – not even nuclear super powers – and that there was none in the past. 
As regards the alleged waning of monetary sovereignty, the usual suspects are the ‘global capital 
markets’ which have taken control and can bring down currencies, financial centres and governments. 
Indeed, capital markets have a great influence on domestic economic policies. However, they operate 
only within a legal framework established and upheld by States. Free movement of capital is nothing 
                                                      
32  Proctor, Mann on the Legal Aspect of Money, 6
th Ed. (Oxford 2005), p. 564. 
33   See Decision of the IMF Executive Board of 15 June 2007 on Bilateral Surveillance of Members’ Exchange Rate 
Policies, available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2007/pn0769.htm (10 July 2007). 
34   The term ‘Payments for current transactions’ is defined in Art. XXX (d) IMF. On this topic see Elizalde, ‘The 
International Monetary Fund and Current Account Convertibility’ in Current Developments in Monetary and Financial 
Law, Vol. 4 (Washington 2005), pp. 17 et seq. 
35   On this topic see Fischer, ‘Capital Account Liberalization’ in IMF (ed.), Current Developments  in  Monetary and 
Financial Law, Vol. 1 (Washington 1999), pp. 1 et seq.; Gianviti, ‘The International Monetary Fund and the 
Liberalization of Capital Movements’ ibid. at pp. 7 et seq.; Hagan, The Design of the International Monetary Fund’s 
Jurisdiction over Capital Movements ibid. at pp. 68 et seq.; Gianviti, ‘Liberalization of Capital Movements: A Possible 
Role for the IMF’ in: IMF (ed.), Current Developments in Monetary and Financial Law, Vol. 2 (Washington 2003), pp. 
217 et seq. Christoph W. Herrmann 
6  EUI-WP RSCAS 2007/28 © 2007 Christoph W. Herrmann 
that markets have imposed, but something that has been made possible by the States because it is seen 
as economically beneficial. It is for every State to decide whether it wants to benefit from economic 
globalisation including foreign capital investments or whether it wants to take the ‘Cuban’ or ‘North 
Korean’ road to the detriment of its people. Sometimes it seems that those who bemoan an alleged 
inability of political actors rather feel dissatisfaction about the substantive outcome of the political 
process, since it does not concur with their view of ‘good policies’. 
At this point, one factual limitation of all monetary sovereignty choices should not be overlooked: 
According to what economic theory commonly calls the ‘impossible trinity’, ‘impossible triad’ or the 
‘trilemma’, it is –in the long– run impossible to combine free movement of capital, fixed exchange 
rates and an independent monetary policy.
36 One will always have to be sacrificed. The problem 
described by the trilemma in my view is not a question of sovereignty. It is simply a matter of factual 
limits to State power as they have always existed. States have at all times been unable to provide 
certain goods to their people, be it security, economic welfare, health etc. and the more they tried to 
provide, the less they delivered. It is a mere truth of life that one has to make choices between 
different opportunities all the time, and it holds true for States – even the most ‘Hobbesian’ ones – as 
well. As long as they still exercise effective control over their territory and the people living there, they 
remain free to make such choices as they deem appropriate, but they have to live with the consequences.  
Monetary Sovereignty ‘Games’ 
States can use their power over the currency in many different ways. Money can be and has been used 
as a coercive means of politics in the past.
37 Monetary policy can allegedly also be the trigger of 
military conflicts. So it has been argued that the 2003 War on Iraq was mainly due to Iraq’s decision to 
switch from US-Dollar to Euro in its oil trade.
38 These matters fall of course into the sphere of 
International Relations theory and International Political Economy. However, they are not subject of 
the present contribution, which is focused on ‘sovereignty games’ as referring to a less aggressive, 
lighter behaviour of States with regard to their sovereignty, including States’ decisions not to make use 
of what is considered to be their lawful sovereign right. 
Every State, in principle, is free not to accede to or withdraw from the IMF. However, given the 
large number of members and the relatively low level of commitments resulting from membership in 
the IMF, I will confine the following submissions to strategic options that can be pursued 
notwithstanding IMF membership, since they do not conflict with its legal rules.  
As pointed out above, a member of the IMF is free to choose between a floating and a fixed 
exchange rate arrangement and is only obliged to ensure the convertibility of its currency for payments 
for current account transactions. In fact, this leaves quite some leeway for policy choices and the 
States widely use them. Given the obligation to allow convertibility at least for current account 
transactions, the key element of every monetary strategy is the exchange rate arrangement a country 
chooses. According to the degree of flexibility, the possible options embrace a freely or managed 
floating currency, a (crawling) currency peg (against one other currency or a basket of currencies), a 
currency board or a fully-fledged ‘dollarisation’ or a monetary union with other countries.
39 
                                                      
36  See Bernanke, ‘Monetary Policy in a World of Mobile Capital’ Cato Journal Vol. 25 (2005) No. 1, pp. 1 – 12, It may be 
possible in a case like China’s Yuan, which is under constant pressure to appreciate. In theory, it would be possible for 
the Bank of China to meet any demand of its currency. At a certain point, however, the increased amount of money in 
China would lead to increased inflation and the central bank would have to change its policies. 
37  See Kirschner, Currency and Coercion (Princeton 1995). 
38  Clark, Petrodollar Warfare: Oil, Iraq and the Future of the Dollar (2005). 
39  See Chown, A History of Monetary Unions (London 2003), pp. 12 et seq.; Corden, Too Sensational: On the Choice of 
Exchange Rate Regimes (Cambridge, USA, 2002), pp. 21 et seq.; Eichengreen, International Monetary Arrangements for 
the 21
st Century (Washington 1994), pp. 9 et seq.; Proctor, Mann on the Legal Aspect of Money (Oxford 2005), pp. 793 et Play Money? Contemporary Perspectives on Monetary Sovereignty 
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As of July 2006
40, of the member countries of the IMF: 
•  25 countries let their currency float, 
•  50 countries had a floating exchange rate without a specific exchange value target,  
•  five countries had installed a crawling peg system,  
•  ten countries (mainly EU Member States not (yet) participating in Stage 3 of EMU) were 
involved in a system of fixed exchange rates with a narrow band of floating (ERM II
41),  
•  51 countries had another conventional fixed exchange rate, 
•  five countries had a currency board in operation, 
•  33 countries were member of a currency union and 




44 or the Principality of Monaco
45 must be added, which also have 
no currency of their own, but use either de jure or de facto the Euro or the Swiss Franc). 
The most liberal regime of course is that of floating exchange regimes, where the determination of 
a currency’s exchange value is left to the market and interventions of public authorities are rare. This 
approach is mainly found in major industrial countries (e.g. the United States, Canada, Japan, 
Australia, New Zeeland, South Korea, Norway, the United Kingdom) and countries already very well 
integrated in the world economy (e.g. Brasil, Chile, Israel, Mexico and Southern Africa). Of course, 
the Euro as the common currency of the 13 countries already participating in stage three of EMU is a 
floating currency as well.
46 Needless to say that for an exchange rate to be really floating, both 
currencies must be floating. 
A pegged currency is characterized by a fixed exchange rate against either – far more frequently – 
one specific currency (e.g. the US-Dollar or the Euro) or against a basket consisting of different 
currencies (only five countries as of July 2006). A variation of a pegged currency is a ‘crawling peg’, 
i.e. the currency is pegged against another one, but the exchange rate is adjusted according to a 
(Contd.)                                                                   
seq. These categories are also used in practice, see e.g. IMF (ed.), Exchange Rate Arrangements and Currency 
Convertibility – Developments and Issues (Washington 1999), pp. 23 et seq.; Deutsche Bundesbank, Devisenkursstatistik 
Februar 2007, p. 50 et seq. (accessible at 
http://www.bundesbank.de/download/volkswirtschaft/devisenkursstatistik/2007/devisenkursstatistik022007.pdf). 
40  See Deutsche Bundesbank, Devisenkursstatistik Februar 2007, p. 50 et seq. (accessible at  
http://www.bundesbank.de/download/volkswirtschaft/devisenkursstatistik/2007/devisenkursstatistik022007.pdf). Data for 
1997 may be found in IMF (ed.), Exchange Rate Arrangements and Currency Convertibility – Developments and Issues 
(Washington 1999), pp. 23 et seq. 
41  Agreement of 16 March 2006 between the European Central Bank and the national central banks of the Member States 
outside the euro area laying down the operating procedures for an exchange rate mechanism in stage three of Economic 
and Monetary Union, OJ 2006 No. C 73/21. 
42  Andorra has no currency of its own. Nowadays, the Euro is used, but on an unofficial basis. Negotiations between the EC 
and Andorra with a view to entering into an exchange agreement similar to those entered into with the Principality of 
Monaco, the Vatican City and the Republic of San Marino have not led to any outcome so far. 
43  See Monetary Agreement of 19 June 1980 between Liechtenstein and Switzerland, Liechtensteinisches Landesgesetzblatt 
(1981 No. 52), pp. 1 et seq. Liechtenstein had already been using the Swiss Franc for more than 50 years before the 
agreement was entered into. 
44  Monetary Agreement between the Italian Republic, on behalf of the European Community, and the Vatican City State 
and, on its behalf, the Holy See, OJ 2001 No. C 299/1. 
45  Monetary Agreement between the Government of the French Republic, on behalf of the European Community, and the 
Government of His Serene Highness the Prince of Monaco, OJ 2002 No. L 142/59. 
46  The Council could, however, enact guidelines for the conduct of monetary policy which the European Central Bank 
would have to take into account in the day-to-day operation of the Community’s external monetary policy, cf. Art. 111 
(2) EC Treaty. Christoph W. Herrmann 
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previously announced scheme.
47 In these cases, the internal money supply is not contingent on the 
foreign anchor currency nor is the balance-of-payments equilibrium automatic. Moreover, the 
monetary policy must be pursued according to the principle of exchange rate targeting. It is this aspect 
in which a currency board deviates significantly from a mere pegged currency. A currency board is a 
monetary authority that issues a domestic currency which is backed up by a foreign reserve currency, 
normally with a backing of at least 100 %, and which is legally obliged to exchange the domestic 
currency against the reserve currency on demand.
48 Contrary to a central bank, a currency board does 
not pursue any kind of ‘monetary policy’ since it has no policy choices to make as regards the money 
supply. The significant impact on monetary policy independence is quite clear in such a case, but it 
becomes literally much more visible for everybody in case of a complete
49 ‘dollarisation’, i.e. a 
substitution of the domestic currency with a foreign currency, which may take place officially as an 
exercise of monetary sovereignty. The foreign currency would in such case be made either sole legal 
tender or circulate alongside the persisting domestic currency. The degree of dollarisation will also 
depend on the policy chosen by the issuing country, which may passively accept, actively encourage 
or actively resist the use of its currency by another country,
50 even though there are no legal rules 
contained in the IMF Articles which prohibit a dollarisation.
51 An active support would e.g. include 
the conclusion of an international agreement granting the adopting country coinage rights, access to 
payment systems and central bank credit. 
A dollarisation can of course also take place unofficially as a consequence of behaviour of private 
individuals.
52 In the latter case the domestic currency – if one ever existed – may be described as a 
‘failing currency’, adopting the image of a ‘failing state’, since it remains legal tender but is not used 
anymore in daily life, even though the respective State may try to suppress the dollarisation.
53 The 
foreign currency does not necessarily need to be the US-Dollar. In fact it may indeed be the Euro, in 
which case it becomes more and more common to speak of ‘euroisation’.
54 
An equally extensive but still quite different restriction (or surrender) of monetary sovereignty is 
associated with the establishment of a currency union. Besides the Euro Area, two of them are found 
in Africa,
55 another one in the Eastern Caribbean,
56 and the Golf Cooperation Council plans to 
establish a customs union.
57 Also in that case, the institutional design can be quite different. 
                                                      
47  Normally, a regular devaluation occurs to accommodate for differences in the targeted or real inflation rate between the 
anchor currency and the pegged currency. 
48  Chown, A History of Monetary Unions (London 2003), p. 16; Ize, ‘Strongly Anchored Currency Arrangements’ in IMF 
(ed.), Current Developments in Monetary and Financial Law, Vol. 2 (Washington 2003), pp. 641 – 656 at 645 et seq.; 
Proctor, Mann on the Legal Aspect of Money, 6
th Ed. (Oxford 2005), p. 801;  
49  A currency board is sometimes referred to as ‘quasi-dollarisation’, see Altig/Nosal, ‘Dollarization – What’s in it for the 
Issuing Country’ in IMF (ed.), Current Developments in Monetary and Financial Law, Vol. 3 (Washington 2005), p. 807. 
50  For a discussion of the perspective of the issuing country see Altig/Nosal, ‘Dollarization – What’s in it for the Issuing 
Country’ in IMF (ed.), Current Developments in Monetary and Financial Law, Vol. 3 (Washington 2005), p. 807. 
51  For a discussion of this point see Gianviti, ‘Use of a Foreign Currency Under the IMF’s Articles of Agreement’ in IMF 
(ed.),  Current Developments in Monetary and Financial Law, Vol. 3 (Washington 2005), p. 817. The situation is 
different with regard to the EU Member States that not yet participate in stage three of EMU. They are under an 
obligation to stay in the ERM II in order to fulfil the Maastricht Criteria on the basis of which the ultimate decision about 
their accession to the Euro Area will be taken. 
52  The degree of an unofficial dollarisation may vary in different countries, depending on whether the foreign currency is 
used only as unit of account and store of value or also for (large or even smaller) daily payments, see Baliño, 
‘Dollarization: A Primer’ in IMF (ed.), Current Developments in Monetary and Financial Law, Vol. 2 (Washington 2003). 
53  That is e.g. the case in Cuba, where the use of US-Dollar was legally prohibited in November 2004. 
54  Cf. Gruson, ‘Dollarization and Euroization’ in IMF (eds.), Current Developments in Monetary and Financial Law, Vol. 2 
(Washington 2003), pp. 629 – 640. 
55  West African Economic and Monetary Union. (UEMOA from its name in French, Union économique et monétaire ouest-
africaine; Member States: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo and Guinea-Bissau) and the Play Money? Contemporary Perspectives on Monetary Sovereignty 
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The Logic of Monetary Sovereignty ‘Games’ 
For many centuries, the main purpose of the State monopoly over money was to raise revenues for the 
government through seignorage profits on coinage and through inflation taxes, thereby protecting the 
financial power of rulers necessary to finance war against foreign enemies. With regard to the 
exchange regime, the maximisation of gold or silver accumulation corresponds to this role of money. 
With the emergence of managed paper currencies without any metal base restricting the money 
supply, more effective taxation systems and other fundamental changes brought about by the 19
th and 
20
th centuries, however, the goals of monetary policy shifted. Keynes General Theory
58 suggested that 
governments could use cheap-money monetary policy and deficit-spending to stabilize economic 
activity and to actively fight unemployment if they accepted some inflation which was seen as a 
necessary instrument to overcome nominal wage rigidities that prevented a downward real-wage 
adjustment in economic downswings and therefore caused huge unemployment. It also accepted a 
consequential decline of the external value of the currency because of its additional price-effect on real wages. 
However, the ideology of intervention did not survive for more than 30 years and with the 
monetarist counter-revolution led by Milton Friedman, a policy preference for stable currencies has 
become almost unanimously supported around the globe.
59 The benefits ascribed to a stable currency 
are pretty well-known: they are the pre-conditions for money to fulfil its fundamental functions of unit 
of account, means of payment and store of value. Inflation leads to intransparent prices, misallocation 
of resources and disguised property transfers from creditors to debtors. Furthermore, a constantly 
inflating currency will be under constant pressure to devaluate externally and it will become 
increasingly difficult to attract foreign capital investment. Generally speaking, a stable currency has a 
major overall economic welfare impact in the long term perspective.
60 It is against this backdrop only 
that the different ways in which States exercise their monetary sovereignty can be understood. In order 
to achieve economic growth and welfare, States will nowadays normally try to integrate into the world 
economy by encouraging cross-border trade and investment. In order to do so, they have to provide 
•  a stable economic environment incl. a stable currency, i.e. one which is not inflating at high 
speed and whose exchange rate is not under constant pressure to devaluate; 
•  (more or less) free convertibility of the currency not only for current account transactions, but 
also for capital account transactions. 
‘Monetary sovereignty games’ can only be understood against this backdrop. As pointed out above, 
the key decision for the monetary sovereign to take concerns the exchange rate arrangement it wants to 
follow. All of the options described above have advantages and disadvantages and to choose between 
(Contd.)                                                                   
Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (or CEMAC from its name in French, Communauté Économique 
et Monétaire de l'Afrique Centrale; Member States: Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Republic of the 
Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon). 
56   Eastern Caribbean Currency Union, part of the Eastern Caribbean Common Market (Member States: Antigua and 
Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and the two 
British overseas territories: Anguilla and Montserrat). 
57  The following quote has been taken from the official website of the GCC: ‘[The cooperation] is also designed to unify 
banking and monetary regulations and laws, as well as increase coordination between monetary agencies and central 
banks, including the initiation of one currency in order to further economic integration.’ (available at http://www.gcc-
sg.org/cooperation.html#coop5). 
58  Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (New York 1935). 
59  See Helleiner, The Making of National Money: Territorial Currencies in Historical Perspective (Ithaca 2003), pp. 230 et seq. 
60  Cf. Ferguson, ‘Monetary Credibility, Inflation, And Economic Growth’ Cato Journal Vol. 26 (2006) No. 2, pp. 223 – 
230; Levy, ‘Sound Monetary Policy, Credibility, And Economic Performance’ Cato Journal Vol. 26 (2006) No. 2, pp. 
231 – 242. Christoph W. Herrmann 
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them will depend upon a great deal of different economic and social circumstances prevailing in the 
country making the choice.
61 
The main advantage of floating exchange rates is seen in the relative gain in internal monetary 
policy independence, which enables the competent authority (i.e. normally the respective central 
bank), to focus on the control of inflation and economic growth inside the country.
62 At the same time, 
a floating exchange rate will always ensure an equalized balance-of-payments, however at the cost of 
private businesses that have to live with changes in their international competitiveness and transaction 
cost caused by the need to hedge the inherent exchange rate risks. Furthermore, floating exchange 
rates do not attract speculation against the currency as may happen in case of a currency that is pegged 
against another one at an exchange rate above or below market rates and the central bank is 
consequentially under no pressure to intervene. This policy choice, as pointed out above, is prevalent 
in industrial countries and there is no obvious reason to abandon it within the foreseeable future, 
especially for the ‘Big Three’ USA, Japan and the Euro Area.
63 They have established credible 
commitments to low inflation, large open economies and only little to gain from more exchange rate 
stability, since the existing exchange risks are hedged by functioning financial markets.
64 
For the rest of the world, matters are by far not as straightforward. For most of these countries, a 
stable currency is still a rather difficult goal to achieve. The reasons for inflation are still very poorly 
known, even though some key factors have been identified: an independent central bank, low level of 
conflict between capital and labour and decentralized forms of governments in federal systems.
65 For 
the last decades, the increasing integration of low-cost producer countries such as China and India into 
global markets and the general competitive pressures deriving from the opening-up of national 
markets are also deemed to have contributed to the lower inflation over the last 25 to 30 years.
66 
Whatever the reasons of inflation are, once an economy has been infected, it becomes very difficult 
and economically very costly to get rid of the disease. The weaker the State and its government in 
general are the less likely a successful reconstruction of a sound monetary system with a stable 
currency is. In such a situation, it may be the most promising way to ‘import monetary stability’ by 
surrendering political monetary sovereignty, which in itself is an exercise of legal monetary 
sovereignty. The key options then are a pegged currency, a currency board or a complete dollarisation. 
However, these options have quite different impacts and the conditions that must be fulfilled to 
maintain them vary. Generally speaking, a simple currency peg, i.e. a fixed but adjustable exchange 
rate will be difficult to operate without capital controls and its likely breakdown creates huge political 
and social costs as demonstrated by Britain’s exit from the ERM I and the Asian crisis of the late 
1990s. This is why this kind of exchange rate regime is frequently ruled out as a policy option in 
economic literature. The remaining choice between a more flexible exchange rate and a more credible 
commitment to exchange rate stability (i.e. non-adjustable) will take into account the following 
                                                      
61  Of the abundant literature on different exchange rate policies and their pros and cons see Corden, Too Sensational: On 
the Choice of Exchange Rate Regimes (Cambridge, USA, 2002); Eichengreen, International Monetary Arrangements for 
the 21
st Century (Washington 1994), IMF (ed.), Exchange Rate Arrangements and Currency Convertibility – 
Developments and Issues (Washington 1999); Sweeney/Wihlborg/Willett (eds.), Exchange-Rate Policies for Emerging 
Market Economies, 1999. 
62  If, however, monetary has only very limited effects on real economies, monetary sovereignty (understood as policy 
sovereignty) is indeed ‘useless’, cf. Schwartz, ‘The Uselessness of Monetary Sovereignty’ Cato Journal Vol. 24 (2004) 
Nos. 1-2, pp. 107 – 121. 
63  See Corden, Too Sensational: On the Choice of Exchange Rate Regimes (Cambridge, USA, 2002), p. 255. 
64  See Eichengreen, International Monetary Arrangements for the 21
st Century (Washington 1994), p. 134. 
65  Busch, ‘Die politische Ökonomie der Inflation’ in Obinger/Wagschal/Kittel (eds.), Politische Ökonomie (Opladen 2003), 
pp. 175 – 197. 
66  Levy, ‘Sound Monetary Policy, Credibility, and Economic Performance’ Cato Journal Vol. 26 (2006) No. 2, pp. 231 – 
242 at 234. Play Money? Contemporary Perspectives on Monetary Sovereignty 
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arguments which are put forward in favour of and against flexible exchange rates or currency board or 
dollarisation solutions.
67 
•  Proponents of flexible exchange rates usually put forward the greater domestic macroeconomic 
policy flexibility that remains under a flexible exchange regime as well as the shock-absorber 
function of flexible exchange rates which allow for easier and less burdensome adjustments than 
a deflationary domestic policy in case of economic shocks. 
•  Proponents of currency boards and dollarisation emphasise the credibility-import that is 
associated with currency boards and dollarisation and the desired consequential loss in domestic 
policy discretion, but point also to the reduction of transaction costs and the likely stimulation of 
trade and investment. 
Which of these arguments are more convincing in a given situation will depend on circumstances 
such as the size of the economy, the credibility of the political institutions involved in monetary and 
fiscal policies, the development and regulation of the financial sector, the degree openness of the 
economy and so on. Furthermore, the loss of seignorage profits in case of a fully-fledged dollarisation 
may play a role as may the need to have a national currency for symbolic integrative purposes, e.g. for 
newly independent states. States having gone through a conflict of a military kind may need a 
complete reconstruction of the monetary and financial system in which a currency board may be a 
quick solution to establish credibility.
68 What decision is being taken will of course also depend on 
policy preferences of domestic politicians, possible alliances between major political groups and long-
term strategic monetary goals such as accession to the Euro Area. 
The creation of a monetary union such as the Euro Area seems to have rather different reasons. Of 
course, the whole scale of arguments against and in favour of fixed exchange rates also applies to a 
monetary union, but in order to reap its benefits, it suffices to fix the exchange rates of the 
participating countries irrevocably. A common currency is not a necessary element of a monetary 
union, as was made clear by the Delors Report that outlined the way to EMU and it also imposes costs 
on private individuals, e.g. in connection with the change of the unit of account. However, it is equally 
clear that a common currency further reduces transaction costs, bolsters the credibility of the 
commitment to ‘exchange rate’ stability and has a significant symbolic meaning for the creation of a 
common identity among the citizens of the participating countries.
69 In the case of EMU, it is also 
commonly asserted that the other European countries intended to benefit from the credibility of the 
Deutsche Bundesbank and import the stability of the Deutsche Mark. Additionally, as it has been 
pointed out, the introduction of the Euro has the potential to challenge the role of the US dollar as the 
predominant international currency (for payments as well as reserve purposes), a role that is 
accompanied by significant economic benefits such as seignorage profits from the currency circulating 
abroad or the benefit of borrowing in domestic currency.
70 
                                                      
67  Cf. Baliño, ‘Dollarization: A Primer’ in IMF (eds.), Current Developments in Monetary and Financial Law, Vol. 2 
(Washington 2003), pp. 613 – 628; Corden, Too Sensational: On the Choice of Exchange Rate Regimes (Cambridge, 
USA, 2002); Eichengreen, International Monetary Arrangements for the 21
st Century (Washington 1994); IMF (ed.), 
Exchange Rate Arrangements and Currency Convertibility – Developments and Issues (Washington 1999); Schuler, 
‘Some Theory and History of Dollarization’ Cato Journal Vol. 25 (2005) No. 1, pp. 115 – 125. 
68  On this particular problem see Lönnberg, ‘Restoring and Transforming Payment and Banking Systems in Postconflict 
Economies’, in IMF (eds.), Current Developments in Monetary and Financial Law, Vol. 3 (Washington 2005), pp. 725 – 
753. 
69  On the costs and benefits of currency unions see Tavlas, ‘Costs and Benefits of Entering the Eurozone’ Cato Journal Vol. 
24 (2004) Nos. 1-2, pp. 89 – 106; Yeager, ‘The Euro facing Other Moneys’ Cato Journal Vol. 24 (2004) Nos. 1-2, pp. 27 
et seq. See also Jonung, ‘The Political Economy of Monetary Unification: The Swedish Euro Referendum of 2003’ Cato 
Journal Vol. 24 (2004) Nos. 1-2, pp. 123 – 149. 
70  See Wegner, ‘EMU and the World Economy’ European Foreign Affairs Review 1998 (3), pp. 451 – 457. Christoph W. Herrmann 
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Conclusions 
What is left then of ‘monetary sovereignty’ at the beginning of the 21
st century and how do States use 
it strategically in their ‘sovereignty games’? The present paper has tried to demonstrate that monetary 
sovereignty is a generally accepted element of State sovereignty and that it consists of a number of 
different sovereign rights including the definition of a unit of account, the issuing of banknotes and 
coins and the establishment of an exchange rate arrangement. The most important international 
monetary agreement, the IMF Articles of Agreement do hardly confine the rights of its members to opt 
for the monetary regime they deem appropriate, except for the obligation to guarantee the 
convertibility of their currency for current account transactions. In fact, there are numerous options 
from which States can ‘choose’. 
However, in making their sovereign choice, States are confronted with a practical ‘trilemma’ 
according to which exchange rate stability, domestic macroeconomic policy discretion and free 
movement of capital cannot coexist for a long time. Whereas in the past monetary sovereignty was 
mainly used for raising revenue (seignorage and inflation tax), the emergence of irredeemable paper 
currencies brought about new perspectives. During the reign of Keynesian macroeconomic policies, 
efforts were made to use loose monetary policies and public deficit spending to fight unemployment 
and economic stagnation. When the outcome after first successes was inflation plus stagnation and 
unemployment (‘stagflation’), the monetarist counter-revolution struck back. As a result, stable non-
inflationary currencies are nowadays universally considered the primary goal of monetary policy. 
However, stable money has a lot to do with credibility of policy and with trust into institutions and 
society, something not all governments are able to generate and to build upon. In such situations, a 
deliberate restriction of domestic macroeconomic policy discretion by means of a credible exchange 
arrangement or a complete dollarisation may be the most effective and efficient way to restore a sound 
monetary system and may generate further benefits such as the stimulation of trade and foreign 
investment. Further reaching restrictions of monetary sovereignty such as they are conjoint with the 
creation of a monetary union will normally have a rationale that goes beyond pure economic reasons, 
but will also rest upon political goals, in particular the creation of an identity beyond the Nation State. 
Whatever decision a State may take, the implications for its economy, society and political system 
will be significant and failure may be extremely costly in economic as well as in political terms. Thus, 
there is no such thing as a ‘monetary sovereignty game’, since the consequences are normally too 
serious, the stakes too high. 
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